

Dear Colleague:

Vital U.S. interests in North Africa are increasingly challenged by growing regional instability. Terrorist incidents in the Maghreb have increased by more than 400 percent since September 11, 2001, and the emergence of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has led to a spike in terror attacks. The single greatest obstacle impeding the security cooperation necessary to combat this transnational threat is the unresolved territorial dispute over the Western Sahara.

In 2007, at the urging of the United States and the United Nations, Morocco, our oldest ally and partner for peace in the Middle East, initiated a ground-breaking autonomy plan to resolve the more than 30 year-old conflict within the framework of self-determination for the Western Sahara. The Moroccan compromise plan received widespread support from the international community as a critical breakthrough for achieving peace and led to four rounds of UN mediated negotiations.

The UN Security Council, in resolution 1754 (2008), described Morocco's compromise efforts as "serious and credible." In pressing for adoption of the resolution the United States reaffirmed the policy initiated under President Clinton, and continued under President Bush, that, "Genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution."

We remain convinced that the U.S. position, favoring autonomy for Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution. We urge you to join us in asking the President to both sustain this longstanding policy, and to make clear that the United States will continue to support this framework for negotiations as the only realistic compromise that can bring this unfortunate and longstanding conflict to an end.

The text of our letter to President Obama is attached below, as is a list of Members who signed our previous letter to President Bush (also attached) on this subject in April 2007. If you wish to sign onto this letter, please contact either of us, or Cesar Gonzalez (x5-4211, Cesar.Gonzalez@mail.house.gov) with Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart, or Dalis Blumenfeld (x5-3345, Dalis.Blumenfeld@mail.house.gov) with Rep. Gary Ackerman.

Sincerely,

s/Gary Ackerman s/Lincoln Diaz-Balart

200 APR 10 AM 11:08
CRIMSON/REGISTRATION UNIT

Dear Mr. President:

Vital U.S. interests in North Africa are increasingly challenged by growing regional instability. Terrorist incidents in the Maghreb have increased by more than 400 percent since September 11, 2001, and the emergence of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has led to a spike in terror attacks against both symbols of national government and institutions reflecting cooperation between the Arab world and the West. The single greatest obstacle impeding the security cooperation necessary to combat this transnational threat is the unresolved territorial dispute over the Western Sahara.

In addition to bringing peace to the people of Morocco and to the Saharawi, and shrinking the space for global terrorist elements to recruit and operate, resolving the conflict in the Western Sahara would have considerable economic benefits and improve the lives of millions of Africans. The entire Maghreb would finally be free to pursue serious economic integration, attract increased foreign investment, and realize the potential for regional trade and cooperation. All of these important goals are currently blocked by the continued conflict and the tension it creates between states in the region.

In 2007, at the urging of the United States and the United Nations, Morocco, our oldest ally and partner for peace in the Middle East, initiated a ground-breaking autonomy plan to resolve the more than 30 year-old conflict within the framework of self-determination for the Western Sahara. The Moroccan compromise plan received widespread support from the international community as a critical breakthrough for achieving peace and led to four rounds of UN mediated negotiations.

The UN Security Council, in resolution 1754 (2008), described Morocco's compromise efforts as "serious and credible." In pressing for adoption of the resolution the United States reaffirmed the policy initiated under President Clinton, and continued under President Bush, that, "Genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution."

After the four rounds of negotiations did not produce any real progress, the UN Secretary General's Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara, Mr. Peter van Walsum, issued an assessment to the Security Council in April 2008. He said, "My conclusion is that an independent Western Sahara is not an attainable goal that is relevant today because it lies at the root of the current negotiation process," and he urged that future rounds of talks be held only on the subject of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.

Unfortunately, following this bold statement the negotiations process stalled. Mr. van Walsum has been replaced by Ambassador Christopher Ross as the new UN Personal Envoy. We are hopeful that Ambassador Ross's appointment will result in the continuation of the talks based on Mr. van Walsum's assessment.

We remain convinced that the U.S. position, favoring autonomy for Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution. We urge you to both sustain

this longstanding policy, and to make clear, in both words and actions, that the United States will work to ensure that the UN process continues to support this framework as the only realistic compromise that can bring this unfortunate and longstanding conflict to an end. We look forward to working with you towards the success of this policy.


Sincerely,

The History of the Western Sahara

A Timeline

The sovereignty of the Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between Morocco and the Polisario Front, a separatist group based in southern Algeria. Morocco reasserted its sovereignty over the territory after Spain withdrew its colonial interests from the area in 1975. The Polisario Front has challenged Morocco's control over the Western Sahara.

The Moroccan Government has undertaken a sizable economic development program in the Western Sahara to provide economic, political and social infrastructure for the region's residents. Today, international efforts are underway to encourage a political settlement between Morocco, the Polisario Front, and Algeria that would resolve sovereignty over the Western Sahara through autonomy.

<p>1578 to 1727 Moroccan Kings rule over the territory currently known as the Western Sahara</p> <p>1884 Spanish colonization begins</p> <p>1956 Morocco claims independence from France Morocco reclaims the Western Sahara at the UN for the first time King Mohammed V formally lays claim to the Sahara</p> <p>1958</p> <p>1963 The UN includes the Western Sahara on the list of non self-governing territories</p> <p>1965 The UN General Assembly adopts its first resolution calling on Spain to decolonize the Sahara</p> <p>1973 The Polisario Front is founded and stages its first attack</p> <p>1974 Algeria begins to oppose Moroccan policy on the Sahara and trains Polisario guerillas</p> <p>1975 The Green March takes place in which 350,000 unarmed Moroccans march South into the desert to reassert the sovereignty of the Sahara from the Spanish Morocco signs Madrid Agreement which seeks to transfer control of the Sahara to a three party administration divided between Morocco, Spain and Mauritania Spain officially terminates its administration of the Sahara</p> <p>1976 The Polisario declares the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and raises the flag of "Western Sahara"</p> <p>1977 Spanish-Moroccan fishing agreement is signed; the Polisario begins attacks on Spanish fishing vessels</p> <p>1990 Morocco and the Polisario accept a UN peace plan, in which a referendum will be held.</p> <p>1991 UN Security Council approves the establishment of Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Organisation d'un Référendum au Sahara (MINURSO)</p>	<p>"By giving the people of the Western Sahara a true voice in their future through the full benefits of autonomy as presented by Morocco, a credible political solution can be achieved." -Former U.S. Sec. of State Madeleine Albright, June 6, 2007</p>  <p>"[T]he Kingdom [of Morocco] has proposed a serious and credible autonomy plan as a basis of negotiation [...] and it constitutes a new proposal element after years of stalemate." -French President Nicolas Sarkozy, October 23, 2007</p> <p>"My conclusion that an independent Western Sahara is not an attainable goal is relevant today because it lies at the root of the current negotiation process." -UN Secretary General's Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara Peter Van Walsum, April 21, 2008</p>	<p>Cease-fire declared in the disputed Western Sahara region</p> <p>Former US Sec. of State James Baker III appointed as UN Special Envoy in the Sahara region</p> <p>Houston Accord is signed between Morocco and Polisario establishing the implementation of a referendum to decide the future of the Western Sahara</p> <p>UN Sec. Gen. Kofi Annan presents the Security Council with four options to break the impasse in the Western Sahara: referendum, autonomy, partition, or complete withdrawal</p> <p>James Baker III announces the "new Baker Plan" for Self-Determination which describes a proposed Western Sahara Authority to administer the territory autonomously until 2007 or 2008, when the referendum would be held</p> <p>Dutch ambassador Peter Van Walsum is confirmed as the new UN Sec. Gen. Special Envoy to the Western Sahara</p> <p>Morocco releases autonomy under sovereignty plan for the Western Sahara which is endorsed by the United States, Spain and France</p> <p>Morocco and the Polisario Front conduct first two rounds of negotiations</p> <p>The Polisario Front threatens a return to armed conflict with Morocco</p> <p>Third round of negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario Front takes place in January; a fourth round resumes in March</p> <p>UN Sec. Gen. Special Envoy Van Walsum calls for realism and deems independence an unattainable option. Parties to the negotiations agree to a fifth round of negotiations to take place at a later date.</p> <p>UN Sec. Gen. appoints seasoned US Diplomat Christopher Ross as the new Special Envoy for the Western Sahara.</p>
		1991
		1997
		2000
		2003
		2005
		2007
		2008
		2009

This information has been produced by the Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP). MACP is a registered agent of the Government of Morocco.
Additional information is available at the Justice Department in Washington, D.C.



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Assessment of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

1. During my visit to the region, I told each of my hosts that I stood by the conclusions I had drawn in my first briefing to the Security Council on 18 January 2006. As the Council had made it clear from the outset that it could only contemplate a consensual solution to the question of Western Sahara and, more specifically, had not reacted in 2004 when Morocco decided that it could not consent to any referendum in which independence was an option, I had concluded that there was no pressure on Morocco to abandon its claim of sovereignty over the Territory and, therefore, that an independent Western Sahara was not a realistic proposition. I felt it necessary to reiterate this conclusion, because it might have become obscured by the fact that both the Moroccan proposal and that of the Frente Polisario were on the agenda of the Manhasset negotiations.

2. My interlocutors in Tindouf and Algiers did not contest my analysis, but disagreed strongly with my conclusion; first, because international legality had to prevail, and second, because the circumstances I described as ‘reality’ might change.

3. My conclusion that an independent Western Sahara is not an attainable goal is relevant today because it lies at the root of the current negotiation process. In my briefing to the Security Council in January 2006, I observed that once the Council recognized that Morocco would not be made to give up its claim to Western Sahara, it would realize that there were only two options: indefinite prolongation of the deadlock or direct negotiations between the parties.

4. On this basis, Secretary-General Annan recommended, first in April and again in October 2006, that the Security Council call on the two parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions. The Security Council did not act on these recommendations. In the second week of April 2007, both parties introduced their respective proposals for the solution of the question of Western Sahara. In his report to the Security Council of 13 April 2007 (S/2007/202), the Secretary-General acknowledged receipt of both proposals and repeated the recommendation to call on the two parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions. Subsequently, in its resolution 1754 (2007) of 30 April 2007, the Security Council took note of both proposals and followed the Secretary-General’s recommendation, presumably due to the impact of the Moroccan proposal to negotiate an autonomy statute for the region. And finally, during the first round of the negotiations, on 18 June 2007, I explained to the parties that I had drawn the conclusion that both proposals were on the agenda.

5. Although this procedure cannot be faulted, its outcome is paradoxical. While Morocco’s rejection of a referendum with independence as an option had triggered the Council’s recourse to recommending negotiations without preconditions, one of the two proposals that are now on the table in these negotiations demands precisely the holding of a referendum with independence as an option. This contradiction may explain why the negotiation process is not leading anywhere: the fundamental positions of the two parties are mutually exclusive. What is an absolute necessity for one is absolutely unacceptable

for the other. For the Frente Polisario, a referendum with independence as an option is indispensable for the achievement of self-determination, whereas Morocco is unable to accept such a referendum, but believes self-determination can be achieved through other forms of popular consultation.

6. As a result, an even more unyielding impasse has established itself right in the heart of the process that was meant to show a way out of the impasse brought about by Morocco's rejection of the Baker Plan (Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara) in 2004 (S/2004/325). A month after the end of my latest tour of the region from 5-15 February 2008, the parties and neighbouring countries met again in Manhasset, from 16-18 March 2008, for the fourth round of their talks. As had been the case in the first three rounds, from 18-19 June and 10-11 August 2007 and 7-9 January 2008, there was hardly any exchange that could be characterized as negotiations. Since April 2007, the equal treatment the Secretary-General had allotted to the two proposals had been progressively modified by the Security Council through the addition of certain references to the Moroccan proposal. First, in resolution 1754 (2007), the Council had inserted the words "welcoming serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution" (fifth preambular paragraph) and called upon the parties to take into account "the developments of the last months" (paragraph 2), and later, in resolution 1783 (2007), it had expanded the latter phrase to: "taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and developments of the last months." In Manhasset, I reminded the delegations that these insertions were integral parts of the two Security Council resolutions, as was the Council's "taking note" of both proposals.

7. Both parties repeatedly commented on the exact meaning of resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007), and, it goes without saying, they attached paramount importance to very different elements. For the Frente Polisario, all that matters is that both proposals are on the table, while according to Morocco the Council has established a clear order between the two. This exercise in textual explanation may be intellectually challenging, but it does not yield the kind of authoritative interpretation that induces the parties to reconsider their positions and to negotiate a compromise solution. What is needed is clearer guidance from the Council itself. I am, of course, aware of the constraints under which Security Council resolutions come into being; but the answer to the vital question of whether one proposal has priority over the other cannot be left to the inevitably controversial interpretation of a number of indistinct phrases. If the Council cannot make a choice, the parties cannot either.

8. There is no conceivable compromise between the parties' views on the role of a referendum with independence as an option. However, I had hoped that the parties, who at the conclusion of the second round of talks agreed that the current *status quo* was unacceptable, would sooner or later show some willingness to explore the implications of possible movement on the basis of the principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed;" but in four rounds of talks, no sign of such willingness has been detected. Therefore, the process is at a standstill, despite the agreement to meet for a fifth round at a date still to be determined.

9. Much will now depend on the interaction between the Security Council's adoption of a new resolution before the end of April, and that fifth round of the negotiation process. If the Council simply extends the process begun by resolution 1754 (2007) and continued by resolution 1783 (2007), there is no doubt that the fifth round will be no different from the first four, and the process will be rightly regarded as deadlocked. Yet, this seems the most likely outcome because in the wider international community the feeling that the *status quo* in Western Sahara is unacceptable is far less prevalent than the feeling that, on balance and all alternatives considered, it may be the least disadvantageous option. Numerous countries consider the *status quo* quite tolerable because it relieves them from the necessity of making painful choices, such as taking sides between Algeria and Morocco. Consolidation of the *status quo* may well be the natural outcome – so to speak, the *default mode* – of the negotiation process.

10. Apart from what the Security Council may or may not be able to do, countries that have close ties with either party might make a greater effort at counteracting that party's tendency to overestimate the strength of its position. Both parties are quick to interpret positive comments from third countries as support for their cause. I have the impression that the prevalence of this phenomenon is responsible for a large number of misconceptions that weaken the political will to search for compromise solutions. In the international community, there is a widespread view that legally the Frente Polisario has the stronger case, but that it is not incumbent on the Security Council to pressure Morocco to pull out of Western Sahara thirty-three years after its taking possession of the Territory. It is as if the Frente Polisario hears only the first part of this sentence, and Morocco only the second. By far the greatest misconception in this category must be the belief that once the current negotiations have foundered, the Security Council will realize that the question of Western Sahara can only be solved by means of a referendum with independence as an option and take action accordingly.

11. If the negotiations end in stalemate again, the continuation of the *status quo* seems unavoidable. It is highly unlikely that in such a situation the Security Council would unanimously lend its full support to one of the two proposals. Yet, the stalemate would have been caused by the fact that the process was launched with two proposals on the table, one that requires a referendum with independence as an option, and the other that rules that out. A way out of this dilemma might be a tentative and temporary change of focus.

12. To initiate this, the Security Council might ask the parties:
- to reconfirm their acceptance of the principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed";
 - to temporarily (e.g. for six to nine months) remove both proposals from the agenda of the talks;
 - to negotiate, this time really without preconditions but on the temporary assumption that there will not be a referendum with independence as an option and that, therefore, the outcome will necessarily fall short of full independence.

In addition, the Council might announce its intention to evaluate the process at the end of the trial period. If at that time it perceives the contours of a possible political solution, it may decide to extend the trial period; if it does not, the *status quo* – with the existing incompatible positions of the parties – will resume of itself.

13. I am aware that the removal of the two proposals from the table would be largely symbolic. Still, as the negotiations are hindered by the fact that two irreconcilable proposals are on the table, the right solution might be to remove both of them. Of course, they would not cease to exist; but their status would be clear: they would just be the parties' goals, to be negotiated between them on the basis of two realities:

- (for the Frente Polisario:) that the Security Council will not make Morocco accept a referendum with independence as an option;

- (for Morocco:) that the United Nations does not recognize Moroccan sovereignty over any part of Western Sahara.

It is important to be as explicit about the latter as about the former because, in the context of the current negotiation process, Morocco so consistently refers to its sovereignty over Western Sahara that it would seem advisable to clarify that this can only express a Moroccan claim, so that in case of an unexpected breakdown of the negotiations there will be absolute clarity about the status of Western Sahara as disputed territory.

14. From the outset, I have emphasised the need to respect political reality alongside international legality. Morocco's physical possession of Western Sahara is political reality, but so is the reality that no country has so far recognized its sovereignty over the Territory. This fact is linked to international legality; the two concepts do not exist in separation. What matters is how political reality and international legality interact to enable us to take the best decisions in real life. I do not accept the view that taking political reality into account is a concession or a surrender, and that it is wrong ever to settle for less than pure legality. The choices to be made are not limited to the dilemma between international legality and political reality. There is also a moral dilemma that comes to light when the virtue of international legality is weighed against the consequences of its pursuit for the people of Western Sahara in real life. The main reason why I find the *status quo* intolerable is that it is too readily accepted, not only by uncommitted onlookers in distant lands, but also by deeply involved supporters of the Frente Polisario, who do not live in the camps themselves but are convinced that those who do would rather stay there indefinitely than settle for any negotiated solution that falls short of full independence.

**Security Council**

Sixty-third year

*Provisional***5884**th meetingWednesday, 30 April 2008, 10.25 p.m.
New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Kumalo	(South Africa)
<i>Members:</i>		
Belgium	Mr. Verbeke	
Burkina Faso	Mr. Kafando	
China	Mr. Liu Zhenmin	
Costa Rica	Mr. Urbina	
Croatia	Mr. Vilović	
France	Mr. Ripert	
Indonesia	Mr. Kleib	
Italy	Mr. Spatafora	
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Mr. Dabbashi	
Panama	Mr. Suescum	
Russian Federation	Mr. Safronkov	
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Quarrey	
United States of America	Mr. Wolff	
Viet Nam	Mr. Hoang Chi Trung	

Agenda

The situation concerning Western Sahara

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara
(S/2008/251)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A.



in favour of the resolution in the hope that through the negotiating process and with the support of MINURSO the people of Western Sahara can one day achieve their right to self-determination.

I now resume my function as President of the Council.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Belgium, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Indonesia, Italy, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Panama, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam

The President: There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 1813 (2008).

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

Mr. Wolff (United States of America): I had intended to focus my remarks on the issue before us, and will do so. But that does not mean we agree with either the interpretation of the process that led to this resolution or the representation of the arguments presented by Council members on the specific issues raised by both Ambassador Urbina and Ambassador Kumalo reflecting the substance of the issue. But let me focus on the issue as we see it before us.

The Western Sahara conflict has gone on too long, provoking tensions, causing human suffering and preventing progress towards regional integration in North Africa. I am sure that all of us around this table yearn for a mutually agreed political solution to this conflict. Four rounds of discussions in the framework of the latest settlement initiative have, however, confirmed the difficulty of arriving at such a solution, despite the seriousness, dedication and sincerity of the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, Peter van Walsum.

In the absence of a settlement, my Government judges the mission of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara to be vital and is pleased that the Council has renewed its mandate for a full year; we appreciate the fact that it was done consensually.

It is our hope that this will permit the parties to engage in the search for a solution in a sustained, intensive and creative manner. To encourage them to do so, we intend to broaden our own engagement with them over the coming weeks and months. For our part, we agree with Mr. van Walsum's assessment that an independent Sahrawi State is not a realistic option for resolving the conflict and that genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution. In our view, the focus of future negotiation rounds should therefore be on designing a mutually acceptable autonomy regime that is consistent with the aspirations of the people of the Western Sahara.

In that regard, Morocco has already produced a proposal that the Security Council has qualified as serious and credible, and we urge the POLISARIO to engage Morocco in negotiation of its details — or to submit a comprehensive autonomy proposal of its own.

Mr. Ripert (France) (*speak in French*): With the adoption of resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007), the international community unanimously welcomed the end of the stalemate on Western Sahara, with the commencement of negotiations without preconditions and in good faith. The lack of progress in the Manhasset negotiations undermines the search for a mutually acceptable, just and lasting political solution negotiated under United Nations auspices, allowing for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. The continuation of the status quo in Western Sahara is an obstacle to building an integrated, prosperous Maghreb and poses a threat to the stability of the entire region.

By resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007), the Security Council unanimously welcomed the serious and credible Moroccan efforts to produce an autonomy plan for Western Sahara. That, of course, is not a sine qua non: the autonomy plan proposed by Morocco forms the basis for serious and constructive negotiation aimed at a negotiated settlement between the parties, with respect for the principle of self-determination, to which we are committed.

We have taken note with interest of the assessment of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, which supplements the information set out in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2008/251). We pay tribute once again to Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy for their efforts to resolve the question of Western Sahara.



Security Council

Distr.: General
30 April 2008

Resolution 1813 (2008)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 5884th meeting, on
30 April 2008**

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Western Sahara,

Reaffirming its strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to implement resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007),

Reaffirming its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect,

Reiterating its call upon the parties and States of the region to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations and with each other to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution,

Taking note of the Moroccan proposal presented on 11 April 2007 to the Secretary-General and welcoming serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution; also taking note of the Polisario Front proposal presented 10 April 2007 to the Secretary-General,

Taking note of the four rounds of negotiations held under the auspices of the Secretary-General; welcoming the progress made by the parties to enter into direct negotiations,

Welcoming the agreement of the parties expressed in the Communiqué of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara of 18 March 2008 to explore the establishment of family visits by land, which would be in addition to the existing program by air, and encouraging them to do so in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,

Welcoming the commitment of the parties to continue the process of negotiations through United Nations sponsored talks,

Noting the Secretary-General's view that the consolidation of the status quo is not an acceptable outcome of the current process of negotiations, and noting further



that progress in the negotiations will have a positive impact on the quality of life of the people of Western Sahara in all its aspects,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 14 April 2008 (S/2008/251),

1. *Reaffirms* the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with MINURSO with regard to the ceasefire;

2. *Endorses* the report's recommendation that realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties are essential to maintain the momentum of the process of negotiations;

3. *Calls upon* the parties to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to enter into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations, thus ensuring implementation of resolutions 1754 and 1783 and the success of negotiations; and *affirms* its strong support for the commitment of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy towards a solution to the question of Western Sahara in this context;

4. *Calls upon* the parties to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect;

5. *Invites* Member States to lend appropriate assistance to these talks;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed on a regular basis on the status and progress of these negotiations under his auspices, and expresses its intention to meet to receive and discuss his report;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide a report on the situation in Western Sahara well before the end of the mandate period;

8. *Urges* Member States to provide voluntary contributions to fund Confidence Building Measures that allow for increased contact between separated family members, especially family visits, as well as for other confidence building measures that may be agreed between the parties;

9. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April 2009;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance in MINURSO with the United Nations zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to keep the Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including pre-deployment awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

11. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

June 6, 2007

The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States of America
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. President:

We applaud the support of your Administration for the adoption of Resolution 1754 by the United Nations Security Council on April 30, 2007, which incorporates the historic initiative by Morocco to end the conflict in the Western Sahara through direct negotiations. This new direction for solving the crisis is in large part the result of your efforts and encouragement.


As the first country to officially recognize the United States in 1777, Morocco has been an historic and reliable ally to our great nation, and we encourage you to continue this cooperation in the challenging months ahead as the negotiations are inaugurated.

Recent terrorist attacks in Morocco and Algeria show that we cannot afford to continue to ignore the problems of this region. Failure to resolve this conflict jeopardizes international stability, our fight against terrorism, and economic integration efforts in the region.


By giving the people of the Western Sahara a true voice in their future through the full benefits of autonomy as presented by Morocco, a credible political solution can be achieved. Morocco's commitment merits the support of the international community and we must ensure that its neighbors assume their responsibility for contributing to the success of these negotiations, as called for in UNSC Resolution 1754.

Mr. President, we know that with your encouragement and support Morocco has courageously shown its leadership with this initiative. Your commitment can make possible a solution to this lingering issue and reaffirm our bipartisan support to a realistic and lasting peace in North Africa.


Sincerely,



Madeleine K. Albright
Former United States Secretary of State



Frank Charles Carlucci III
Former United States Secretary of Defense




Mickey Kantor

Former United States Secretary of Commerce and
Former United States Trade Representative




Hazel R. O'Leary
Former United States Secretary of Energy




Wesley Clark

Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander




Ben Gilman
Former Member, United States House of Representatives and
Chairman, House Committee on International Relations




Thomas Daschle

Former United States Senator and Senate Majority Leader



Thomas R. Pickering
Former United States Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and
Former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Russia, India,
Israel, El Salvador, Nigeria, and Jordan



Martin Indyk

Former Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs and Former United States Ambassador to Israel




Edward S. Walker Jr.
Former Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs and Former United States Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and the
United Arab Emirates




Thomas Nassif

Former United States Ambassador to Morocco and Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and
South and Central Asian Affairs




Michael Ussery
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco and Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central
Asian Affairs



Frederick Vreeland

Former United States Ambassador to Morocco and Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and
South and Central Asian Affairs




Dov Zakheim
Former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and
Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense



Peter W. Rodman

Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs



Leon Fuerth
Former National Security Advisor to Vice President Albert A. Gore Jr.



American Jewish Committee

Office of Government and International Affairs
1156 Fifteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005 www.ajc.org 202-785-4200 Fax 202-785-4115 E-mail ogia@ajc.org

Jason F. Isaacson
DIRECTOR

April 19, 2007

Dear Representative:

The American Jewish Committee, an organization that advances inter-religious and inter-ethnic understanding and is dedicated to the success of moderation and pluralism in the Arab and Muslim world, urges your endorsement of a letter circulated by Representatives Ackerman and Diaz-Balart supporting a just-released proposal for autonomy in the disputed Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty.

The Ackerman/Diaz-Balart letter asks President Bush to support the Moroccan plan – and seek international acceptance of it – as a sound basis to resolve the Western Sahara conflict, a source of regional instability and human suffering for more than 30 years.

Cognizant of the historic links between – and the broad common interests of – the United States and Morocco, and as an institutional partner of the Moroccan Jewish community, the American Jewish Committee strongly supports efforts by our Government and the Kingdom to enhance cooperation in many spheres, from the struggle against terrorism and extremism, to expanded economic opportunity in the Maghreb, cultural and educational exchange, and political reform. It was our faith in this vital relationship that underlay AJC's support for the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement of 2004, and is the foundation of our ongoing dialogue with Moroccan officials and civil society on pressing issues of regional peace, security and human rights.

Reinforced by the recent assertion of Under Secretary Burns that the Moroccan proposal is “serious and credible” and would “provide real autonomy for the Western Sahara,” we view U.S. advocacy of this approach as critical to the further enhancement of ties between our nation and the Kingdom, the continued advance of political and economic progress in Morocco, and effective pursuit of cooperative strategies to counter regional instability and international terrorism. We urge your signature on the Ackerman/Diaz-Balart letter to President Bush.

With appreciation for your consideration of AJC’s views on this matter, I remain,

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jason F. Isaacson".

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

April 26, 2007

The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:


The Kingdom of Morocco, one of our oldest and closest allies, recently submitted a proposal to resolve the three decade long struggle over the Western Sahara. This historic initiative grants profound local autonomy to the Western Sahara while recognizing Morocco's territorial integrity. This compromise is a breakthrough opportunity to find an enduring political solution, and U.S. support is critical to its successful implementation.

As you know, the conflict in the Western Sahara has gone on for too long at great humanitarian cost. Since the 1991 UN imposed cease-fire, all efforts to provide a realistic and durable solution to the conflict have failed. The new Moroccan proposal provides a realistic framework for a negotiated political solution, which is the best way to ensure a lasting peace for all parties.


The United States has a major national security interest in the stability and economic prosperity of North Africa. With al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups expanding their presence into North Africa, we are concerned that the failure to resolve this conflict of more than 30 years poses a danger to U.S. and regional security, while simultaneously preventing the economic integration of the Arab Maghreb Union.

The Moroccan autonomy proposal constitutes an historic opportunity for the United States to help end this problem and provide a better future for the entire region. We urge you to embrace this promising Moroccan initiative so that it receives the consideration necessary to achieve international acceptance.

Sincerely,



Tom Lantos



George J. Mitchell
Henry M. Jackson

Lincoln Diaz-Balart (FL)
Tom Lantos (CA)

David Scott (GA)
Art Davis (AL)
Tom Allen (ME)
David Wu (OR)
Joe Courtney (CT)
Allyson Schwartz (PA)
Mel Watt (NC)
Jane Harmon (CA)
Tom Bishop (NY)

Alcee Hastings (FL)
Ruben Hinojosa (TX)
Charles Boustany (LA)
Jeff Fortenberry (NE)
John Tanner (TN)
James Clyburn (SC)
Mary Bono (CA)
David Scott (GA)
Chris Murphy (CT)

Shelly Berkeley (NV)
Solomon Ortiz (TX)
Bud Cramer (AL)
Rahm Emanuel (IL)
Marcy Kaptur (OH)
Bob Filner (CA)
Roscoe Bartlett (MD)
Norm Dicks (WA)
Jim Moran (VA)

D. Wasserman Schultz (FL)
Eric Cantor (VA)
Michael Capuano (MA)
Jim Costa (CA)
Edward Markey (MA)
Henry Waxman (CA)
Doc Hastings (WA)
Ken Calvert
Bart Gordon

Mike McNulty (NY)
Carolyn Maloney (NY)
Steve Israel (NY)
Russ Carnahan (MO)
William Jefferson (LA)

Gary Ackerman (NY)
Steny Hoyer (MD)

John Larson (CT)
Bill Delahunt (MA)
Barney Frank (MA)
Ellen Tauscher (CA)
Jim Matheson (UT)
Neil Abercrombie (HI)
Carolyn McCarthy (NY)
Jim Marshall (GA)
Elliot Engel (NY)

Tammy Baldwin (WI)
Vernon Ehlers (MI)
Keith Ellison (MN)
John Boehner (OH)
Pat Murphy (PA)
Steve Chabot (OH)
Ron Klein (FL)
Brian Higgins (NY)
Adrian Smith (NE)

Ed Pastor (AZ)
Jerrold Nadler (NY)
Loretta Sanchez (CA)
Maurice Hinchey (NY)
Leonard Boswell (IA)
Nick Rahall (WV)
Jesse Jackson (IL)
John Dingell (MI)
Brad Sherman (CA)

Jean Schmidt (OH)
Chris Van Hollen (MD)
Robert Aderholt (AL)
Mike Pence (IN)
Anna Eshoo (CA)
Donald Manzullo (IL)
Michael McCaul (TX)
Rick Renzi
Ed Whitfield

Michael Arcuri (NY)
Joe Crowley (NY)
John Barrow (GA)
Albert Wynn (MD)
Frank Pallone (NJ)

Steve Rothman (NJ)
Jose Serrano (NY)
Robert Wexler (FL)
Gregory Meeks (NY)

Cliff Sterns (FL)
Wally Herger (CA)
Rob Bishop (UT)
Randy Kuhl (NY)
Jack Kingston (GA)
Vito Fossella (NY)
Chris Cannon (UT)
Bill Young (FL)
John McHugh (NY)
Joe Knollenberg (MI)

Ron Lewis (KY)
Joe Wilson (SC)
Dennis Hastert (IL)
John Duncan (CA)
Hal Rogers (KY)
Thad McCotter (MI)
John Sullivan (OK)
Steve Buyer (IN)
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL)
Virginia Foxx (NC)

John Mica (FL)
Dave Weldon (FL)
Adam Putnam (FL)
Ric Keller (FL)
Dan Burton (IN)
Tom Reynolds (NY)
Phil Gingrey (GA)
John Linder (GA)
Randy Forbes (VA)
John Shadegg (AZ)

Frank LoBiondo (NJ)
Tom Feeney (FL)
Ander Crenshaw (FL)
Jeff Miller (FL)
Scott Garrett (NJ)
Phil English (PA)
Kevin Brady (TX)
Gus Bilirakis (FL)
John Doolittle (CA)
Tom Tancredo (CO)

Anthony Weiner (NY)
Janice Schakowsky (IL)
Dan Boren (OK)
Edolphus Towns (NY)

Elton Gallegly (CA)
Chip Pickering (MS)
Kay Granger (TX)
Candice Miller (MI)
Howard Coble (NC)
Mark Souder (IN)
Dan Lungren (CA)
Roy Blunt (MO)
Lee Terry (NE)
Steve King (IA)

Walter Jones (NC)
Mario Diaz-Balart (FL)
Vern Buchanan (FL)
Sue Myrick (NC)
Jo Ann Davis (VA)
Thelma Drake (VA)
Spencer Bachus (AL)
Nathan Deal (GA)
Lamar Smith (TX)
Bob Goodlatte (VA)

Darrell Issa (CA)
Ted Poe (TX)
Connie Mack (FL)
Pete Sessions (TX)
Devin Nunes (CA)
Tom Price (GA)
Mike Simpson (ID)
Sam Johnson (TX)
Tom Petri (WI)
Mike Ferguson (NJ)

Ginny Brown-Waite (FL)
Bill Shuster (PA)
Steve LaTourette (OH)
Pat Tiberi (OH)
Rodney Frelinghuysen (NJ)
Ray LaHood (IL)
Brian Bilbray (CA)
Jerry Weller (IL)
Buck McKeon (CA)
Jim Saxton (NJ)

The Moroccan Initiative in the Western Sahara

Background:

The Moroccan initiative comes in response to repeated requests of the United Nations Security Council and several of its key members, including the United States, that Morocco propose a solution to this longstanding problem that could facilitate the opening of negotiations for a "just, durable and peaceful" political solution.

After nearly a decade of trying to bring the Polisario and Morocco to agreement to conduct a referendum to determine the territories future, Kofi Annan, then Secretary General, and James Baker, then Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara, reported to the Security Council that it was not possible to achieve agreement between the Polisario and Morocco on the central issue of who should be permitted to vote in a referendum. Consequently, Annan and Baker recommended that the Security Council encourage Morocco and the Polisario to enter into direct negotiations to find a compromise political solution. The Security Council accepted the assessment of Annan and Baker that a referendum would not be possible, and began a process carried through several years of UNSC resolutions calling for direct negotiations.

James Baker proposed two such compromise political solutions based on the underlying assumption that the proposals would allow Morocco to remain sovereign in the Western Sahara, but that the territory would benefit from a substantial autonomy that would allow it to become self-governing. Morocco accepted the first Baker proposal as the basis for direct negotiations, but the Polisario refused. The Polisario accepted the second Baker proposal, but Morocco refused since it did not allow for direct negotiations between the parties on the terms of the arrangement.

The Moroccan proposal is the first and only proposal to come from one of the Parties to the conflict in response to the Security Council encouragements. In various forms, the Polisario has continued to insist that the referendum be held, and threatens a renewal of hostilities and the eviction of the United Nations peacekeeping force from the territory under its control, despite the fact that the Security Council repeatedly has made clear that this solution is no longer viable.

Summary of the Moroccan Initiative:

The initiative is the product of a year long internal and foreign Moroccan consultation process. All sectors of the Sahrawi population were included in the consultations and the views of foreign governments and expert international authorities were sought before the plan was finalized for presentation to the United Nations.

The plan itself represents an outline for a political solution that traces what Morocco considers to be the broad scope of an autonomy arrangement for the Western Sahara. It does not go into extensive detail on its various aspects on the assumption that such specific arrangements should be the result of direct negotiations rather than the imposition of only one of the parties to the dispute.

The plan provides for a local elected legislature that would subsequently elect an executive authority. It also would establish a separate judiciary for the autonomous region with competence to render justice on matters specific to the autonomous status of the region. The legislature would elect a chief executive.

The formula proposed by Morocco would ensure majority representation in the legislature for Sahrawi inhabitants of the autonomous region, while also ensuring credible legislative representation for non-Sahrawis who have been long-time residents in the territory. Residents of the autonomous region would also continue to elect representatives to the national legislature.

The government of the autonomous region would have exclusive authorities on some issues, shared authority with the central government of Morocco on others and consultative rights on authorities that remain reserved to the central government and that effect the region.

The autonomous government would control local administration, local police, education, cultural development, economic development, regional planning, tourism, investment, trade, public works and transportation, housing, health, sports and social welfare. It would have taxing authorities to support these functions and would continue to receive funding from the central budget as well. It would be able to establish foreign regional trade relations offices and would have consultative rights on other sovereign foreign agreements affecting the region.

The central government would retain exclusive jurisdiction over the normal elements of sovereign authority: national defense, currency, postal, and foreign affairs and religion, over which the Monarchy has a special status in Morocco.

The chief executive of the autonomous region would be elected by the legislature, but would be invested by and serve in the name of the Monarchy.

The initiative also envisages transitional bodies to guide the central government and the autonomous authority through the initial stages of implementation of the plan.

All individual rights guaranteed under the Moroccan Constitution would continue to apply to all residents of the autonomous region.

MOROCCAN INITIATIVE FOR NEGOTIATING AN AUTONOMY STATUTE FOR THE SAHARA REGION

I. Morocco's commitment to a final political solution

1. Since 2004, the Security Council has been regularly calling upon "*the parties and States of the region to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution.*"
2. Responding to this call by the international community, the Kingdom of Morocco set a positive, constructive and dynamic process in motion, and pledged to submit an autonomy proposal for the Sahara, within the framework of the Kingdom's sovereignty and national unity.
3. This initiative is part of the endeavors made to build a modern, democratic society, based on the rule of law, collective and individual freedoms, and economic and social development. As such, it brings hope for a better future for the region's populations, puts an end to separation and exile, and promotes reconciliation.
4. Through this initiative, the Kingdom of Morocco guarantees to all Sahrawis, inside as well as outside the territory, that they will hold a privileged position and play a leading role in the bodies and institutions of the region, without discrimination or exclusion.
5. Thus, the Sahara populations will themselves run their affairs democratically, through legislative, executive and judicial bodies enjoying exclusive powers. They will have the financial resources needed for the region's development in all fields, and will take an active part in the nation's economic, social and cultural life.
6. The State will keep its powers in the royal domains, especially with respect to defense, external relations and the constitutional and religious prerogatives of His Majesty the King.
7. The Moroccan initiative, which is made in an open spirit, aims to set the stage for dialogue and a negotiation process that would lead to a mutually acceptable political solution.
8. As the outcome of negotiations, the autonomy statute shall be submitted to the populations concerned for a referendum, in keeping with the principle of self-determination and with the provisions of the UN Charter.
9. To this end, Morocco calls on the other parties to avail the opportunity to write a new chapter in the region's history. Morocco is ready to take part in serious, constructive negotiations in the spirit of this initiative, and to contribute to promoting a climate of trust.
10. To achieve this objective, the Kingdom of Morocco remains willing to cooperate fully with the UN Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy.

II. Basic elements of the Moroccan proposal

11. The Moroccan autonomy project draws inspiration from the relevant proposals of the United Nations Organization, and from the constitutional provisions in force in countries that are geographically and culturally close to Morocco. It is based on internationally recognized norms and standards.

A. Powers of the Sahara autonomous Region

12. In keeping with democratic principles and procedures, and acting through legislative, executive and judicial bodies, the populations of the Sahara autonomous Region shall exercise powers, within the Region's territorial boundaries, mainly over the following:

- Region's local administration, local police force and jurisdictions;
- in the economic sector: economic development, regional planning, promotion of investment, trade, industry, tourism and agriculture;
- Region's budget and taxation;
- infrastructure: water, hydraulic facilities, electricity, public works and transportation;
- in the social sector: housing, education, health, employment, sports, social welfare and social security;
- cultural affairs, including promotion of the Saharan Hassani cultural heritage;
- environment.

13. The Sahara autonomous Region will have the financial resources required for its development in all areas. Resources will come, in particular, from:

- taxes, duties and regional levies enacted by the Region's competent authorities;
- proceeds from the development of natural resources allocated to the Region;
- the share of proceeds collected by the State from the development of natural resources located in the Region;
- the necessary funds allocated in keeping with the principle of national solidarity;
- proceeds from the Region's assets.

14. The State shall keep exclusive jurisdiction over the following in particular:

- the attributes of sovereignty, especially the flag, the national anthem and the currency;
- the attributes stemming from the constitutional and religious prerogatives of the King, as Commander of the Faithful and Guarantor of freedom of worship and of individual and collective freedoms;
- national security, external defense and defense of territorial integrity;
- external relations;
- the Kingdom's juridical order.

15. State responsibilities with respect to external relations shall be exercised in consultation with the Sahara autonomous Region for those matters which have a direct bearing on the prerogatives of the Region. The Sahara autonomous Region may, in consultation with the Government, establish cooperation relations with foreign Regions to foster inter-regional dialogue and cooperation.
16. The powers of the State in the Sahara autonomous Region, as stipulated in paragraph 13 above, shall be exercised by a Representative of the Government.
17. Moreover, powers which are not specifically entrusted to a given party shall be exercised by common agreement, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity.
18. The populations of the Sahara autonomous Region shall be represented in Parliament and in the other national institutions. They shall take part in all national elections.

B. Bodies of the Region

19. The Parliament of the Sahara autonomous Region shall be made up of members elected by the various Sahrawi tribes, and of members elected by direct universal suffrage, by the Region's population. There shall be adequate representation of women in the Parliament of the Sahara autonomous Region.
20. Executive authority in the Sahara autonomous Region shall lie with a Head of Government, to be elected by the regional Parliament. He shall be invested by the King.
The Head of Government shall be the Representative of the State in the Region.
21. The Head of Government of the Sahara autonomous Region shall form the Region's Cabinet and appoint the administrators needed to exercise the powers devolving upon him, under the present autonomy Statute. He shall be answerable to the Region's Parliament.
22. Courts may be set up by the regional Parliament to give rulings on disputes arising from enforcement of norms enacted by the competent bodies of the Sahara autonomous Region. These courts shall give their rulings with complete independence, in the name of the King.
23. As the highest jurisdiction of the Sahara autonomous Region, the high regional court shall give final decisions regarding the interpretation of the Region's legislation, without prejudice to the powers of the Kingdom's Supreme Court or Constitutional Council.
24. Laws, regulations and court rulings issued by the bodies of the Sahara autonomous Region shall be consistent with the Region's autonomy Statute and with the Kingdom's Constitution.
25. The Region's populations shall enjoy all the guarantees afforded by the Moroccan Constitution in the area of human rights as they are universally recognized.
26. An Economic and Social Council shall be set up in the Sahara autonomous Region. It shall comprise representatives from economic, social, professional and community groups, as well as highly qualified figures.

III. Approval and implementation procedure for the autonomy statute


27. The Region's autonomy statute shall be the subject of negotiations and shall be submitted to the populations concerned in a free referendum. This referendum will constitute a free exercise, by these populations, of their right to self-determination, as per the provisions of international legality, the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.
28. To this end, the parties pledge to work jointly and in good faith to foster this political solution and secure its approval by the Sahara populations.
29. Moreover, the Moroccan Constitution shall be amended and the autonomy Statute incorporated into it, in order to guarantee its sustainability and reflect its special place in the country's national juridical architecture.
30. The Kingdom of Morocco shall take all the necessary steps to ensure full integration, into the nation's fabric, of persons to be repatriated. This will be done in a manner which preserves their dignity and guarantees their security and the protection of their property.
31. To this end, the Kingdom of Morocco shall, in particular, declare a blanket amnesty, precluding any legal proceedings, arrest, detention, imprisonment or intimidation of any kind, based on facts covered by this amnesty.
32. Once the parties have agreed on the proposed autonomy, a Transitional Council composed of their representatives shall assist with repatriation, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed elements who are outside the territory, as well as with any other action aimed at securing the approval and implementation of the present Statute, including elections.
33. Just like the international community, the Kingdom of Morocco firmly believes today that the solution to the Sahara dispute can only come from negotiations. Accordingly, the proposal it is submitting to the United Nations constitutes a real opportunity for initiating negotiations with a view to reaching a final solution to this dispute, in keeping with international legality, and on the basis of arrangements which are consistent with the goals and principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter.
34. In this respect, Morocco pledges to negotiate in good faith and in a constructive, open spirit to reach a final, mutually acceptable political solution to the dispute plaguing the region. To this end, the Kingdom of Morocco is prepared to make a positive contribution to creating an environment of trust which would contribute to the successful outcome of this initiative.
35. The Kingdom of Morocco hopes the other parties will appreciate the significance and scope of this proposal, realize its merit, and make a positive and constructive contribution to it. The Kingdom of Morocco is of the view that the momentum created by this initiative offers a historic chance to resolve this issue once and for all.

TRENDS & TIMELINE: Terrorism in N. Africa

Sept. 11, 2001 – Dec. 2008

**Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya,
Mauritania, and Mali**

Attacks by Terrorists in N. Africa Since 9/11



Since Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda and other militant extremists based in North Africa have increased more than 430%, from 21 to 113 a year, through 2007. More than 500 terrorist bombings, murders, kidnappings and ambushes, in and out of region, have claimed more than 1,000 lives and 4,000 victims – in Algeria, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and elsewhere.

December 27, 2008

8 soldiers were wounded by a bomb which targeted an Army patrol near Tarek Ibn Ziad in the Wilaya of Ain Defla
www.maghrebia.com

December 27, 2008

2 alleged terrorists were shot dead just outside the Algiers city limits after they tried to force through a security forces check point on the road between Meftah and Larbaa, Wilaya of Blida
www.maghrebia.com

December 25, 2008

A 20-strong AQMI unit attacked a Civil Defence barracks at Azeffoun, Tizi Ouzou, stealing a sizeable stock of supplies and equipment
www.elwatan.com

December 20, 2008

20 people killed and several taken hostage in an attack by Tuareg rebels on a military base in northern Mali
www.bbc.co.uk

December 20, 2008

3 alleged terrorists were shot dead after evidence emerged that the three men had been sent to carry out terror attacks in Oran from AQMI's main stronghold in Kabylia
www.maghrebia.com

December 8, 2008

One civilian was killed and two injured when a bomb exploded in Umm Touba, Skikda wilaya, east of Algiers
www.maghrebia.com

December 5, 2008

A bomb wounded 2 people in Umm Touba, Skikda wilaya, east of Algiers
www.maghrebia.com

November 24, 2008

At least 2 soldiers were injured in a bomb explosion at Djemoura municipality, Biskra province. The bomb targeted security forces carrying a racking operation in the region
www.maghrebia.com

November 6, 2008

Terrorists assassinated the president of the Communal Popular Assembly (APC) in the eastern Algerian town of Timezrit. Bejaia province after abducting him. His body was found inside the charred remains of his official vehicle
www.maghrebia.com

November 5, 2008

The National Gendarmerie dismantled a bomb in Kedara, Boumerdes. The explosive reportedly targeted security services in the region
www.maghrebia.com

November 1, 2008

Al-Qaeda militants from Tunisia have handed 2 Austrians they kidnapped in February to military authorities in Mali
www.bbc.co.uk

October 18, 2008

Algerian security forces who stopped a vehicle at a Rakouba checkpoint uncovered 25 tons of chemical fertilizer allegedly bound for an al-Qaeda bomb-making workshop in Souk Ahras province
www.maghrebia.com

October 15, 2008

A bomb explosion in the region of Setif, east of Algiers killed 3 municipal guards and injured another 2

September 30, 2008

6 Algerian communal guards were ambushed and killed near their barracks at Théniat El Had by around 20 AQIM militants in Sidi-Boutouchent, Tissemsilt province
www.magharebia.com

September 28, 2008

A suicide car bomber attacked the coastal town of Dellys in the Takdempt district. 3 were killed
wits.nctc.gov

September 19, 2008

Malian army attacks anti-Touareg militia, 2 killed including a soldier
www.alertnet.org

September 14, 2008

12 Mauritanian soldiers were captured and later beheaded in northern Mauritania
wits.nctc.gov

August 20, 2008

In Bouira, 2 car bombs were detonated by remote control. More than 11 killed and 31 injured
wits.nctc.gov

August 19, 2008

A suicide car-bomber attacked a police academy in Boumerdès Province. 43 were killed including a policeman and 45 were injured
wits.nctc.gov

August 6, 2008

Troops staged a coup in Mauritania and held the President after he tried to dismiss the military's top commanders
www.bbc.co.uk

July 14, 2008

A leader of Al-Qaida in Algeria was killed in a security forces raid
wits.nctc.gov

June 26, 2008

4 police officers killed, 2 others wounded in armed attack by suspected AQIM in Aftis, Jijel
wits.nctc.gov

June 8, 2008

2 explosions in the town of Beni Amrane 13 killed
wits.nctc.gov

June 5, 2008

A suicide bomber targeted a military barracks in an eastern Algiers suburb but killed only himself
wits.nctc.gov

June 6, 2008

A roadside bomb killed 6 soldiers and wounded 4 in Cap Djennat
www.magharebia.com

June 6, 2008

2 soldiers killed, 4 civilians wounded in suicide bomb attack by AQIM in Bordj el Kiffan
wits.nctc.gov

May 17, 2008

1 civilian killed in a bomb attack in Cap Djinet, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

May 22, 2008

Touareg rebels attack an army post in Mali's extreme northeast, killing 27 people including 10 government soldiers and injuring 31 others
www.bbc.co.uk

May 11, 2008

A group of bandits attacked a Malian gendarmerie base in the town of Ansongo, south of Gao, in eastern Mali
wits.nctc.gov

May 6, 2008

Touareg rebels attacked two army camps in Mali on Tuesday, killing one soldier and looting a weapons store
www.stratfor.com

April 30, 2008

5 accused terrorists were arrested on charges that they organized and led attacks in Mauritania by an al-Qaida-linked cell
www.magharebia.com

April 10, 2008

Mastermind behind December 2007 killings of French tourists arrested
www.iht.com

April 5, 2008

5 civilians wounded in a bomb attack by AQIM in Zemmouri, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

April 5, 2008

1 police officer killed in armed attack by AQIM in Tigzirt, Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

March 22, 2008

Touareg rebels ambushed a military convoy, killing 3 soldiers capturing at least 20 and seizing 8 vehicles near the town of Abebara
www.bbc.co.uk

March 21, 2008

Touareg rebels are accused for killing 5 civilians including a child when their vehicle ran over a landmine in Mali's northern desert
wits.nctc.gov

March 21, 2008

Assailants detonated a bomb as a vehicle passed, killing 5, in Ti-n-Zaouatene, Kidal. Tuaregs believed responsible
wits.nctc.gov

February 22, 2008

2 Australian tourists kidnapped in Tunisia by Tunisian Al-Qaeda militants
www.bbc.co.uk

February 16, 2008

1 soldier killed, 3 others, 1 civilian wounded in a bomb attack near Tadmaït, Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

February 13, 2008

1 security guard killed in armed attack in Ammal, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

February 8, 2008

8 police officers killed in armed attack by AQIM in El Oued, El Oued
wits.nctc.gov

February 8, 2008

1 police officer wounded in a bomb attack in Chender, Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

February 6, 2008

2 police officers wounded in armed attack in Tizi Ouzou, Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

February 1, 2008

Gunmen opened fire on Israel's embassy in Mauritania. 5 civilians and 3 French nationals were injured
wits.nctc.gov

January 29, 2008

Suicide bomber attacks a police station at Thenia. 4 killed and 20 injured
wits.nctc.gov

January 2, 2008

A suicide attack killed 4 police officers, wounded 23 civilians and 8 officers in Naciria
wits.nctc.gov

2008**December 28, 2007**

4 soldiers were killed by terrorists near the country's northern border
www.magharebia.com

December 26, 2007

AQIM held responsible for attack on a military patrol near Oudane, Adrar, killing 3 soldiers
wits.nctc.gov

December 8, 2007

1 vehicle damaged in a bomb attack in Sebt Aziz, Medea
wits.nctc.gov

November 17, 2007

4 civilians kidnapped by armed assailants in Tebessa
wits.nctc.gov

February 19, 2008

7 men including 2 Tunisians detained over the Feb.1 incident were released due to lack of evidence
www.bbc.co.uk

February 15, 2008

2 police officers wounded in a bomb attack in Lakhdaria, Bouira
wits.nctc.gov

February 9, 2008

Police patrol targeted in a bomb attack by suspected AQIM in Ain El Hamra, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

February 7, 2008

1 police officer killed, 1 other wounded in armed attack by suspected Islamic extremists in Tala Alem, Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

February 4, 2008

3 people killed, seven others wounded in a bomb attack in Naciria, Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

January 30, 2008

1 civilian wounded in a bomb attack in Aghribs, Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

January 11, 2008

Authorities arrested 2 of 3 Mauritanian suspects wanted for the killing of 4 French tourists in December 2007
www.magharebia.com

December 26, 2007


2 police officers killed in armed attack by AQIM in Lakhdaria, Bouira
wits.nctc.gov


December 11, 2007


2 suicide truck bombers attacked U.N. offices in Algiers, killing 37 people and injuring 171
wits.nctc.gov

November 18, 2007

3 aircraft, 1 airport damaged in armed attack by suspected Islamic extremists







March 28, 2007

In Boumerdes, AQIM members detonated a bomb seconds after the head of Boumerdes' Judicial Police Mobile Brigade passed by, causing no injuries
wits.nctc.gov

April 5, 2007

In Lakhdaria, Bouira, assailants detonated 2 bombs placed on railroad tracks, damaging the railroad tracks but causing no injuries
wits.nctc.gov

March 11, 2007

Armed assailants of the Unity, Justice and Equality Front fired upon a polling station in Kaedi, Gorgol, killing a police officer and a security guard
wits.nctc.gov

March 11, 2007

2 bombers attacked an internet café. 1 of them was killed the other injured along with 3 others
www.bbc.co.uk

March 6, 2007

1 police building damaged in a bomb attack in Baghlia, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

March 4, 2007

7 gendarmes killed, 1 other wounded in bombing attacks in Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

March 3, 2007

Islamic extremists bombed a bus carrying workers for a Russian company. 1 Russian engineer and 3 Algerians were killed
www.magharebia.com

February 26, 2007

In Ouled Moussa, armed assailants ambushed a paramilitary member and his family, killing 1 family member, and wounding him and 2 of his family members
wits.nctc.gov

February 28, 2007

In Boumerdes, armed AQIM militants attacked a Gendarmerie guard post, wounding 2 civilians
wits.nctc.gov

February 9, 2007

In Laadjarda, assailants detonated 2 bombs wounding 2 civilians
wits.nctc.gov

February 12, 2007

7 bombs explode east of Algiers. 6 people were killed and 13 injured
wits.nctc.gov

February 2, 2007

In Benchoud, Boumerdes, assailants detonated a bomb in a municipal soccer stadium, wounding 2 civilians
wits.nctc.gov

February 6, 2007

The mayor of Benchoud is assassinated outside his home
wits.nctc.gov

January 30, 2007

5 soldiers and 10 Islamists were killed in fighting in the eastern region of Batna
www.bbc.co.uk

January 30, 2007

In Zemmouri, Boumerdes, a bomb planted in a vehicle exploded, wounding the occupant
wits.nctc.gov

January 27, 2007

1 police officer wounded in armed attack by suspected AQIM in Si Mustapha, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

January 28, 2007

1 government building damaged in a bomb attack by suspected AQIM in Ouled Aissa, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

January 21 , 2007

In Tidjelabine, Boumerdes, armed assailants attacked a Gendarmerie roadblock, wounding 2 gendarmes
wits.nctc.gov

January 21, 2007

A roadside bomb exploded under an army vehicle in eastern Algeria. 1 soldier was killed and 8 wounded
www.iht.com

January 2007

Tunisia said it killed 12 GSPC
wits.nctc.gov

January 5, 2007

Insurgents killed 18 soldiers in an ambush south of Algiers
wits.nctc.gov

November 22, 2006

In Lagraf, Biskra, armed assailants kidnapped 2 civilians and killed 3 soldiers and 2 civilians who tried to rescue the kidnapped victims
wits.nctc.gov

November 21, 2006

GSPC shoots down a military helicopter, killing 3 soldiers and 2 local guards
wits.nctc.gov

November 13, 2006

1 police officer wounded in a bomb attack in Tizgirt, Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

November 9, 2006

Militants ambushed an army patrol in Bouira killing 7 soldiers and wounding 13
www.stratfor.com

November 8, 2006

In Batna, armed assailants killed 1 civilian and stole 80 sheep
wits.nctc.gov

November 2, 2006

1 civilian killed, 4 soldiers wounded in coordinated bombing attacks in Sidi Daoud, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

November 3, 2006

15 militants ambushed an army patrol in the Ain Defla region killing 8 soldiers
www.magharebia.com

October 30, 2006

In Boumerdes, a bomb exploded wounding 1 civilian and damaging the vehicle he was driving
wits.nctc.gov

November 1, 2006

In Sidi Daoud, Boumerdes, a bomb exploded wounding 1 civilian
wits.nctc.gov

October 28, 2006

In Pirette, Tizi Ouzou, armed assailants attacked a roadblock, wounding 2 civilians and 1 police officer
wits.nctc.gov

October 29, 2006

GSPC members detonated 2 truck bombs in Reghaia and Dergana. 3 civilians were killed and 24 were wounded
wits.nctc.gov

October 23, 2006

3 civilians held hostage in a cafe by suspected GSPC in Chabet El Ameur, Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

October 23, 2006

Algerian Islamic insurgents launched a revenge attack against a group of former Touareg rebels in the deserts of northern Mali, killing nine of them
wits.nctc.gov

October 22, 2006

In Boumerdes, assailants erected a barricade on a road and extorted money from passing civilians no one was injured
wits.nctc.gov

October 21, 2006

In Thenia, Boumerdes, assailants fired upon a taxi carrying a driver and 4 soldiers, killing the driver, wounding the soldiers
wits.nctc.gov

October 21, 2006

In Jijel Province, armed assailants killed 3 members of the Jijel National Gendarmerie group
wits.nctc.gov

October 19, 2006

An explosive device detonates at a police station in El Harrach. Separately, a fuel cistern explodes in Lakhdaria
wits.nctc.gov

October 19, 2006


6 soldiers wounded in a bomb attack by suspected GSPC in Algiers
wits.nctc.gov

October 15, 2006

3 police officers wounded in a bomb attack by suspected GSPC in Bordj Menaiel, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

October 15, 2006

8 security guards killed in attack by suspected GSPC in Sidi Medjahed, Ain Defla
wits.nctc.gov



August 3, 2006

In Bordj el Kiffan, assailants detonated a bomb placed in a trash can near a routine police roadblock by a signal from a cell phone, wounding 3 police officers
wits.nctc.gov

July 29, 2006

Authorities found the bodies of 2 civilians near Chrea, Blida
wits.nctc.gov

July 20, 2006

Insurgents killed 4 government municipal guards
www.stratfor.com

July 19, 2006

In Tamedna, Skikda, assailants lobbed homemade mortars into the town, barely missing a cafe, but causing no injuries
wits.nctc.gov

July 19, 2006

In Tanouna, Jijel, suspected GSPC killed a former municipal guard at his home
wits.nctc.gov

July 10, 2006

In Boumerdes suspected GSPC assassinated killed the brother of a former member of GSPC as he was standing in front of his house
wits.nctc.gov

July 12, 2006

5 municipal guards were killed in an ambush in the province of Tipasa
wits.nctc.gov

July 10, 2006

In Annaba, assailants ambushed a Patriot militia group patrol, killing 1 member
wits.nctc.gov

July 10, 2006

1 civilian killed, 2 others taken hostage, later released in armed attack in Sidi Chaib, Sidi Bel Abbes
wits.nctc.gov

July 6, 2006

In Tidjelabine, Boumerdes, assailants detonated a remote-controlled bomb, killing 2 municipal guards, wounding another and 6 civilians
wits.nctc.gov

July 5, 2006

In Ammal, Boumerdes, assailants detonated a remote-controlled bomb wounding 3 municipal guards
wits.nctc.gov

July 3, 2006

In Lakhdaria, Bouira, 2 bombs placed on railroad tracks exploded, causing damage but no injuries
wits.nctc.gov

July 2, 2006

Poultry workers targeted in a stop work order by armed assailants in Taliouine, Bouira
wits.nctc.gov

June 21, 2006

7 soldiers killed in fighting with insurgents in Ghzerwal
wits.nctc.gov

June 20, 2006

5 civilians killed in fighting between Algerian troops and insurgents in Khenchela
www.stratfor.com

June 20, 2006

5 farmers killed in assault and arson by suspected GSPC in Blida
wits.nctc.gov

June 19, 2006

In Boumerdes, a bomb exploded, wounding 3 police officers and 1 civilian near a bus station
wits.nctc.gov

June 18, 2006

1 police officer wounded in bomb attack in Baghlia, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

June 18, 2006


In Tizi Ouzou, a remotely-controlled bomb exploded, killing 3 civilians and wounding 3 others
wits.nctc.gov


June 14, 2006


2 civilians killed by Islamists near Gouraya, Tipaza for their failure to follow Islamist teachings

May 30, 2006

In Boumerdes, assailants detonated a remotely controlled bomb at a busy intersection, injuring







July 12, 2005
In El Milia, Jijel, assailants fired upon and killed a municipal guard as he was walking towards a water supply post
wits.nctc.gov

July 12, 2005
In Ahnif, a bomb planted on a path used by municipal guards exploded, killing 1 guard
wits.nctc.gov

July 4, 2005
In Oued El-Merdja, Blida, assailants wearing Afghan attire and carrying machine guns fired upon and wounded 4 civilians as they were hiking
wits.nctc.gov

July 4, 2005
Radio journalist kidnapped, beaten and left for dead by unidentified assailants in Bamako
wits.nctc.gov

June 23, 2005
An explosive device kills 1 policeman on the road
www.stratfor.com

June 22, 2005
In Skikda, assailants detonated a bomb as a vehicle passed, killing the driver and wounding 2 other passengers
wits.nctc.gov

June 18, 2005
Near Djelfa, a bomb buried under the road exploded after a police patrol ran over it, killing the head of the police in Djelfa and wounding 2 police officers
wits.nctc.gov

June 18, 2005
An explosive device killed a policeman during a police raid in El-Djer
www.stratfor.com

June 13, 2005
An explosive device kills 3 soldiers and 2 civilians west of Tipaza
wits.nctc.gov

June 13, 2005
2 police officers, 2 civilians killed and 6 civilians wounded in armed attack in Khadirat El Nukta, Tebessa Province
www.stratfor.com

June 4, 2005
15 Mauritanian soldiers were killed and 17 injured in an attack by GSPC on the Lemgheity army base
www.bbc.co.uk

June 9, 2005
An explosive device kills 13 local government guards in a truck in Algeria's M'sila region southeast of Algiers
www.bbc.co.uk

June 4, 2005
Deputy mayor killed in armed attack by suspected GSPC in Aomar, Bouira
wits.nctc.gov

May 31, 2005
1 civilian killed in armed attack in Tarik Ibn Ziad, Ain Defla
wits.nctc.gov

May 27, 2005
1 soldier killed in bomb explosion by suspected GSPC in Ain Defla Province
wits.nctc.gov

May 15, 2005
Insurgents ambushed an army convoy in the region

May 20, 2005
1 civilian, 3 children kidnapped by suspected GSPC at a bogus roadblock in Beni Khelifa, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

May 28, 2005
Near Batna, assailants killed a shepherd and burned his body
wits.nctc.gov

April 23, 2005

In Jijel, armed assailants attacked the mayor's vehicle, killing the mayor, wounding 1 army officer, and burning the vehicle
wits.nctc.gov

April 23, 2005

In Chlef, a group of 25 suspected GSPC members shot and killed 2 brothers
wits.nctc.gov

April 13, 2005

In Ramka, armed assailants fired on a vehicle at a fake roadblock, killing 2 forest rangers, wounding 3 others
wits.nctc.gov

April 22, 2005

In Tebessa Province, a bomb exploded in a mountainous area, killing 2 civilians
wits.nctc.gov

April 13, 2005

2 civilians killed, 5 others wounded in armed attack by suspected GSPC in Relizane Province
wits.nctc.gov

April 13, 2005

3 municipal guards killed, 3 police officers wounded in bomb attacks by suspected GSPC in El-Ogla, Tebessa Province
wits.nctc.gov

April 10, 2005

1 civilian kidnapped by suspected GSPC in Serdj-El-Ghoul, Setif Province
wits.nctc.gov

April 9, 2005

Militants killed 14 people at a fake roadblock. In addition another 36 people, including 15 security force members were killed since the start of March
www.stratfor.com

April 8, 2005

2 civilians killed in armed attack in Chekfa, Jijel
wits.nctc.gov

April 7, 2005

13 civilians killed, 1 other wounded in arson and armed attack by suspected GSPC at illegal roadblock in Tablat, Blida Province
wits.nctc.gov

April 4, 2005

Near Dellys, Boumerdes, assailants detonated a bomb and fired upon a police vehicle carrying prisoners, killing 5 police officers, wounding 11 others
wits.nctc.gov

April 3, 2005

3 civilians, 1 municipal guard killed, 3 police officers, 1 municipal guard wounded in a bomb attack by suspected GSPC near Dellys, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

April 3, 2005

Suspected GSPC killed a civilian and stole his sheep in Chlef Province
wits.nctc.gov

April 3, 2005

2 municipal guards wounded in a bomb attack in Keddara, Blida Province
wits.nctc.gov

April 1, 2005

In Jijel Province, a bomb planted in a hen house exploded, wounding 2 children
wits.nctc.gov

March 29, 2005

1 civilian kidnapped and killed by suspected GSPC near Thenia, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

March 19, 2005

In Jijel, a bomb exploded inside a hen house, injuring 2 Algerian civilians and killing an unspecified quantity of livestock
wits.nctc.gov

March 13, 2005

In Skikda, assailants opened fire on a car that refused to stop at a fake roadblock, injuring 2 civilians and taking 5 civilians hostage
wits.nctc.gov

March 10, 2005

2 policemen killed, 2 others wounded in armed attack in Bouira
wits.nctc.gov

February 25, 2005

2 civilians wounded in a bomb attack in Souk El-Khemis
wits.nctc.gov

March 9, 2005

Train track damaged by bomb blast in Ammal, Boumerdes
wits.nctc.gov

January 24, 2005

In Tizi Ouzou, armed assailants attacked a security patrol, killing 2 police officers and injuring 1 civilian
wits.nctc.gov

January 22, 2005

1 soldier killed in assault and arson attack at a fake roadblock by

January 21, 2005

December 13, 2004
GSPC insurgents shoot an individual dead at point-blank range in Corso
www.stratfor.com

December 28, 2004
Suspected GSPC shot and killed 3 civilians and wounded 1 child in Khraissia
wits.nctc.gov

November 27, 2004
Bomb explosion killed 1 Municipal Guard and wounded 3 others in Sidi Bel Abbes Province
wits.nctc.gov

November 28, 2004
Suspected Salafi Dawa attacked a group of civilians in Mascara, killing 1 man and wounding 3 others
wits.nctc.gov

November 4, 2004
2 police officers were killed and 1 wounded in an attack in Relizane
wits.nctc.gov

November 18, 2004
Landmine believed to have been planted by GSPC killed 1 civilian in Mahrane
wits.nctc.gov

October 25, 2004
2 soldiers, 2 police officers, and 1 civilian were attacked and killed at an illegal roadblock near Tizi Ouzou
wits.nctc.gov

October 25, 2004
Bomb explosion near a municipal guard post in Skikda wounding 2 guards
wits.nctc.gov

October 3, 2004
Suspected GSPC attacked a police patrol in central Algiers, wounding 8 police officers and 1 civilian
wits.nctc.gov

October 22, 2004
Militants attacked a vehicle near Medea carrying fans to a football match in the capital Algiers killing 16 people
www.stratfor.com

September 29, 2004
Militants attacked a civil defense post near the city of Ain Defla killing 6 members of the civil defense force
www.stratfor.com

October 2, 2004
Armed men attacked the National Security Chief's home in Nouakchott, causing damage but no casualties
wits.nctc.gov

September 18, 2004
4 civilians were killed and 1 abducted at a fake roadblock in Omar. No one claimed responsibility
wits.nctc.gov

September 20, 2004
Militants killed 4 people and abducted a woman in Bouira Province at a roadblock they set up
www.stratfor.com

August 26, 2004
Train was attacked while passing by the Ahnif station, but the bomb was set off prematurely; No injuries reported
wits.nctc.gov

September 15, 2004
A bomb was defused in a café in Jijel province
www.mipt.org

August 22, 2004
A bomb explodes outside Boumerdes. No casualties reported; GSPC is suspected in the attack
www.stratfor.com

August 25, 2004
2 bombs damaged a line of track and injured a conductor outside Ahnif train station
wits.nctc.gov

August 1, 2004
Bomb attack near an electricity company in Siana Mansouria killed 3 and injured 1
wits.nctc.gov

August 3, 2004
A Boumerdes University truck was intercepted near Sghirat and subsequently burned
wits.nctc.gov

June 28, 2004
The army killed three Islamic extremists in a raid near the capital, Algiers
www.news24.com

July 3, 2004
A bomb exploded in Taourarine causing no injuries or damage
wits.nctc.gov

June 21, 2004
A car bomb injures 11 people and damages the

May 21, 2004

5 suspected members of the GSPC shot and wounded 1 civilian in Tizouighine
www.start.umd.edu

May 18, 2004

2 bombs exploded killing 2 soldiers and wounding 13 people, including 4 soldiers
www.stratfor.com

May 1, 2004

GSPC members used a bomb to kill 2 soldiers and wound several others in the Chrea forest, southeast of Bouira
www.start.umd.edu

April 30, 2004

7 members of the security forces, 6 civilians and 2 militants were killed in a clash
www.news24.com

March 16, 2004

Gunmen ambush 2 ambulances traveling along the Medea-Berrouaghia road. 8 were killed and 2 wounded
wits.nctc.gov

March 17, 2004

Islamic militants killed 7 and injured 2 in an attack on a funeral procession in advance of a presidential visit to the area, south of Algiers
www.start.umd.edu

March 10, 2004

GSPC assassinates an imam from El Harrach for alledged collaboration with the Algerian security services
wits.nctc.gov

March 12, 2004

Suspected GSPC assassinated an elected official of the Municipal People's Assembly and 1 other man
wits.nctc.gov

February 11, 2004

A bomb attack by suspected GSPC wounded 1 police officer in Lakhdaria, Bouira
wits.nctc.gov

February 12, 2004

Ambush on a police patrol killed 7 police officers and wounded 3 others
wits.nctc.gov

February 7, 2004

The Algerian Army attacks a band of militants in northern Mali, from where they are chased eastward across northern Niger and into Chad
wits.nctc.gov

February 7, 2004

The Algerian army killed 3 Islamic extremists in a raid near the capital, Algiers
wits.nctc.gov

2004

November 27, 2003

In Messad, Algeria, a well-known poet and member of the extended Royal Saudi family was killed and 4 others were injured
www.bbc.co.uk

December 10, 2003

A homemade bomb exploded in an olive grove near El Milia. 2 women were seriously injured
www.mipt.org

September 4, 2003

Suspected GSPC members killed 2 soldiers and injured 3 in a bomb attack east of Algiers
www.start.umd.edu

September 23, 2003

GSPC gunmen attacked a money transport truck near the town of Tigzirt. No casualties reported
www.start.umd.edu

September 11, 2003

Jewish Moroccan national, Alberto Ribido, was killed by Salafia Jihadia, a radical Islamic group
Friendsofmorocco.org

August 19, 2003

August 26, 2003

May 17, 2003

3 security force members were killed and 4 others wounded by an attack on their patrol by an armed Islamic group in the mountains east of Algiers
www.mipt.org

May 17, 2003

Assassination attempt on the mayor of Harchoun, which is located in Chlef Province
www.start.umd.edu

May 17, 2003

2 policemen were seriously wounded when a bomb exploded in Tigzirt. No one claimed responsibility
www.start.umd.edu

May 6, 2003

Suspected GSPC militants ambushed and attacked 6 soldiers in Keddara
www.start.umd.edu

May 16, 2003

14 bombers attacked in Casablanca, targeting the Jewish and Western. 33 civilians were killed and more than 100 injured
www.bbc.co.uk

March 28, 2003

Suspected GIA (Armed Islamic Group) gunmen killed 4 civilians, including 2 children, and wounded 4 other children in an attack in Chiffa
www.start.umd.edu

March 28, 2003

Suspected GIA gunmen killed 8 people, 7 from the same family, in an attack in Chtathia
www.start.umd.edu

February 25, 2003

12 civilians were killed and several wounded when Islamist militants attacked a convoy of vehicles at a fake roadblock in a village west of Algiers
www.start.umd.edu

February 21, 2003

Islamic militants abducted and then killed 4 members of a Government Armed Civil Defense Patrol unit in Ouargla Province
www.start.umd.edu

February 13, 2003

GIA assailants attacked a family in El Atatfa municipality, killing 2 women and abducting 1 other
www.start.umd.edu

Feb -May, 2003

Free Salafists Group or GSL allegedly captures 32 European tourists in southern Algeria and were later moved to Mali
www.globalsecurity.org

January 29, 2003

GSPC gunmen opened fire on a guard barracks in M'kira, resulting in 3 fatalities and 4 wounded
www.start.umd.edu

January 18, 2003

A roadside bomb planted by extremists attacked a military convoy in Tizi Ouzou Province, wounding 3
www.start.umd.edu

January 7, 2003

8 soldiers on patrol were killed by two bombs set off by the GSPC in Tizi Ouzou
www.start.umd.edu

January 6, 2003

Militants ambushed a military convoy in north-east Algeria and attacked families near Algiers. 43 soldiers and 13 civilians were killed and 19 wounded
www.start.umd.edu

December 12, 2002

A bomb exploded at a market in Boukadir killing 4 civilians and wounding 16 others
www.start.umd.edu

November 12, 2002

2 civilians were killed in a gunfire attack on a cafe in Ksar El Boukhari
www.start.umd.edu

October 16, 2002

Suspected GIA members killed 13 students and injuring 2 others in a mosque in El Hadjadj
www.start.umd.edu

October 2, 2002

Militants killed 13 civilians in a remote village in western Algeria
www.news24.com

September 19, 2002

15 people are reported to have been arrested in Kabylie under suspicion of providing money and logistical help to the GSPC
www.bbc.co.uk

September 13, 2002

Militants killed 11 civilians on a road in near Sidi Lakhdar. So far 1 070 killed since beginning of the year
www.news24.com

August 14, 2002

A bomb exploded near a movie theater and the headquarters of the Islamist Movement for National Reform in Tebessa
www.mipt.org

August 12, 2002

GSPC militants opened fire in a restaurant in Baghlia killing 1 civilian security guard and kidnapping and later killing the other
www.start.umd.edu

August 7, 2002

Suspected Ed'daoua Es'salafia Liqadha militants shot and killed 5 civilians in Ammi Moussa
www.start.umd.edu

August 9, 2002

A homemade bomb exploded at a resort near Skikda killing 5 (including 2 police officers) and injuring 6
www.start.umd.edu

August 1, 2002

Gunmen opened fire in Ain Defla wounding a policeman
www.start.umd.edu

August 1, 2002

2 bombs exploded in Metessa killing 1 soldier and injuring 4 others
www.start.umd.edu

August 1, 2002

A homemade bomb was found in Sofia Square near the Algiers Central Post Office
www.mipt.org

July 25, 2002

A bomb was discovered and defused in a café in Algiers
wits.nctc.gov

July 28, 2002

Militants killed 1 soldier and wounded 3 others when they ambushed their vehicle near Kadira
wits.nctc.gov

July 16, 2002

Gunmen killed 6 civilians at a cafe in Benimen
www.start.umd.edu

July 17, 2002

Militants killed 7 civilians in Ouled Allal
www.start.umd.edu

July 5, 2002

A bomb exploded in an open-air market in Algiers killing 30 and injuring 36 others
www.start.umd.edu

July 5, 2002

A bomb exploded on Palm Beach injuring a young child
www.start.umd.edu

July 5, 2002


A bomb explosion at a cemetery honoring war veterans killed 1 civilian and injured 1 other
www.start.umd.edu

June 28, 2002

Gunmen opened fire on a passenger bus in Les Eucalyptus killing 13 people and injuring 9
www.start.umd.edu

June 27, 2002

Gunmen opened fire on a passenger bus in Bou Ismail killing the 2 people
www.start.umd.edu



2002

January 3, 2002

5 people, including one of the attackers, were shot and killed at a security post in Bab Lakouas
www.start.umd.edu

January 1, 2002

Ambush on soldiers and members of self-defense groups on a search operation left 2 injured
www.start.umd.edu

December 26, 2001

1 civilian was killed and 13 injured in an attack on a taxi in Tiaret
www.start.umd.edu

December 20, 2001

4 people killed and 1 injured at a bogus roadblock near Ami Moussa
www.start.umd.edu

December 15, 2001

GSPC shot and killed the city chairman of Ouled Aissa and his companion at a café in Ouled Aissa
www.start.umd.edu

December 15, 2001

Bomb explosion in Ait Ouabane killed 2 teenagers and seriously injured 2 others
www.start.umd.edu

December 13, 2001

1 guard was killed and 2 were seriously wounded in an attack in Chlef on a group of communal guards gathering to confront suspected terrorists
www.start.umd.edu

December 14, 2001

2 policemen were shot and killed by a group of 10 suspected Muslim militants in a café in Tafoughalt
www.start.umd.edu

December 9, 2001

2 people were killed and another wounded at an illegal roadblock in Chlef
www.start.umd.edu

December 8, 2001

Militants attacked an Algerian Army patrol in Chrea wounding 1 soldier
www.start.umd.edu

December 8, 2001

GSPC attack at a café in Aomar killed 1 civilian and injured another
www.start.umd.edu

December 6, 2001

17 people were killed and 5 injured by armed assailants in three houses in Aarib
www.start.umd.edu

December 5, 2001

Suspected GSPC militants shot and killed 2 soldiers and 3 communal guards in Zekri
www.start.umd.edu

December 3, 2001

2 people were killed and 2 girls kidnapped in an attack on a hamlet near Beni Bouateb
www.start.umd.edu

November 20, 2001

Bomb explosion at Tafourah bus station in Algiers injured 29 civilians and damaged a bus and nearby building
www.start.umd.edu

October 28, 2001

Attackers stormed the town in Bouira and opened fire, wounding 2 civilians
www.start.umd.edu

October 25, 2001

3 soldiers were killed and several wounded by a homemade mine in Oum Ali. The GIA was suspected
www.start.umd.edu

October 2, 2001

An explosive device detonated in a pizza parlor south of Algiers. Killed 1 and wounded 8 others
www.start.umd.edu

September 28, 2001

4 GSCP members killed 2 policemen and wounded another at a